A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation (Record no. 35264)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02179naaaa2200301uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70998
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20220219182631.0
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001
024 7# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001
Terms of availability doi
041 0# - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title English
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE
Authentication code dc
072 #7 - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code PBUD
Source bicssc
072 #7 - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code PBF
Source bicssc
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Ray, Debraj
Relationship auth
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Oxford University Press
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2007
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 electronic resource (336 p.)
506 0# - RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS NOTE
Terms governing access Open Access
Source of term star
Standardized terminology for access restriction Unrestricted online access
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
536 ## - FUNDING INFORMATION NOTE
Text of note New York University Shanghai
540 ## - TERMS GOVERNING USE AND REPRODUCTION NOTE
Terms governing use and reproduction Creative Commons
Use and reproduction rights https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Source of term cc
-- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
546 ## - LANGUAGE NOTE
Language note English
650 #7 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Game theory
Source of heading or term bicssc
650 #7 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Algebra
Source of heading or term bicssc
653 ## - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED
Uncontrolled term agreements, bargaining, blocking, cooperative games, coalitions, coalition formation, coalition structure, efficiency, farsightedness, partition functions
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Host name www.oapen.org
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/49736/1/9780199207954.pdf">https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/49736/1/9780199207954.pdf</a>
Access status 0
Public note DOAB: download the publication
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Host name www.oapen.org
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70998">https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70998</a>
Access status 0
Public note DOAB: description of the publication

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