Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics (Record no. 52301)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02719naaaa2200301uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/36914
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20220219235633.0
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number oso/9780198858584.001.0001
024 7# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.1093/oso/9780198858584.001.0001
Terms of availability doi
041 0# - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title English
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE
Authentication code dc
072 #7 - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code PSAD
Source bicssc
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Pugh, Jonathan
Relationship auth
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Oxford University Press
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2020
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 electronic resource (298 p.)
506 0# - RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS NOTE
Terms governing access Open Access
Source of term star
Standardized terminology for access restriction Unrestricted online access
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics, and the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as an uncontroversial claim in this sphere. Yet, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship between rationality and autonomy. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether “. . . the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent”. In this book, I bring recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, I develop a new framework for thinking about the concept, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in personal autonomy. Furthermore, the account outlined here allows for a deeper understanding of different form of controlling influence, and the relationship between our freedom to act, and our capacity to decide autonomously. I contrast my rationalist with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and outline the revisionary implications it has for various practical questions in bioethics in which autonomy is a salient concern, including questions about the nature of informed consent and decision-making capacity.
536 ## - FUNDING INFORMATION NOTE
Text of note Wellcome Trust
540 ## - TERMS GOVERNING USE AND REPRODUCTION NOTE
Terms governing use and reproduction Creative Commons
Use and reproduction rights https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Source of term cc
-- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
546 ## - LANGUAGE NOTE
Language note English
650 #7 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Bio-ethics
Source of heading or term bicssc
653 ## - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED
Uncontrolled term bioethics
653 ## - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED
Uncontrolled term autonomy
653 ## - INDEX TERM--UNCONTROLLED
Uncontrolled term rationality
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Host name www.oapen.org
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/37740/1/autonomy.pdf">https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/37740/1/autonomy.pdf</a>
Access status 0
Public note DOAB: download the publication
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Host name www.oapen.org
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/36914">https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/36914</a>
Access status 0
Public note DOAB: description of the publication

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