000 02207naaaa2200253uu 4500
001 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/63969
005 20220219181102.0
041 0 _aEnglish
042 _adc
072 7 _aPSAN
_2bicssc
245 1 0 _aChapter 13 The Role of Neuroscience in Precise, Precautionary, and Probabilistic Accounts of Sentience
260 _bSpringer Nature
_c2020
300 _a1 electronic resource (13 p.)
506 0 _aOpen Access
_2star
_fUnrestricted online access
520 _aGiven that there is currently no consensus as to exactly which animals are sentient, how should we make moral decisions when we are uncertain as to which of the animals influenced by that decision are sentient? And how relevant is evidence from the neurosciences for making these decisions? In this chapter, I outline three different approaches toward incorporating uncertainty about sentience into moral decision-making: what I call precise, precautionary, and probabilistic approaches to sentience. I suggest that neuroscientific evidence has different relevance for each of these accounts. Precautionary approaches should be adopted to provide basic protections for animals even when we are uncertain about their sentience, but probabilistic accounts are more relevant for decisions where we need to carefully weigh positive and negative consequences of different possible decisions. Precise accounts can be useful for providing guidance but are not directly relevant for making decisions or guiding policy.
536 _aWellcome Trust
540 _aCreative Commons
_fhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
_2cc
_4https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
546 _aEnglish
650 7 _aNeurosciences
_2bicssc
653 _aSentience, Consciousness, Arguments by analogy, Precautionary principle
773 1 0 _0OAPEN Library ID: https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/47111
_7nnaa
856 4 0 _awww.oapen.org
_uhttps://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/47111/1/Bookshelf_NBK555334.pdf
_70
_zDOAB: download the publication
856 4 0 _awww.oapen.org
_uhttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/63969
_70
_zDOAB: description of the publication
999 _c34373
_d34373