000			01860naaaa2200265uu 4500
001			https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70700
005			20220219182119.0
041	0		_aEnglish
042			_adc
072		7	_aHP _2bicssc
100	1		_aShepherd, Joshua _4auth
245	1	0	_aChapter 4 The Folk Psychological Roots of Free Will
260			_aLondon _bBloomsbury Academic _c2017
300			_a1 electronic resource (14 p.)
506	0		_aOpen Access _2star _fUnrestricted online access
520			_aDebates surrounding free will are notorious for their intractability. This is so in spite of the fact that, even at a fairly fine grain of analysis, competing views on the nature of free will are well understood. Why can’t philosophers find common ground? One line of thought that has emerged fairly recently draws on the psychology of concepts. The general idea is that an explanation for persistent disagreement about free will, and perhaps guidance toward resolution, might be found by exploring the psychological roots of “our concept” of free will—for example, those psychological factors that underlie our tendencies to say, of some bit of human behavior, that it was performed of an agent’s own free will, or not.
536			_aWellcome Trust
540			_aCreative Commons _fhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ _2cc _4https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
546			_aEnglish
650		7	_aPhilosophy _2bicssc
653			_afree will; psychology
773	1	0	_0OAPEN Library ID: https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49427 _7nnaa
856	4	0	_awww.oapen.org _uhttps://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/49427/1/Bookshelf_NBK464490.pdf _70 _zDOAB: download the publication
856	4	0	_awww.oapen.org _uhttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70700 _70 _zDOAB: description of the publication
999			_c34952 _d34952