000			02179naaaa2200301uu 4500
001			https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70998
005			20220219182631.0
020			_aacprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001
024	7		_a10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001 _cdoi
041	0		_aEnglish
042			_adc
072		7	_aPBUD _2bicssc
072		7	_aPBF _2bicssc
100	1		_aRay, Debraj _4auth
245	1	0	_aA Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
260			_aOxford _bOxford University Press _c2007
300			_a1 electronic resource (336 p.)
506	0		_aOpen Access _2star _fUnrestricted online access
520			_aThe formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
536			_aNew York University Shanghai
540			_aCreative Commons _fhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ _2cc _4https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
546			_aEnglish
650		7	_aGame theory _2bicssc
650		7	_aAlgebra _2bicssc
653			_aagreements, bargaining, blocking, cooperative games, coalitions, coalition formation, coalition structure, efficiency, farsightedness, partition functions
856	4	0	_awww.oapen.org _uhttps://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/49736/1/9780199207954.pdf _70 _zDOAB: download the publication
856	4	0	_awww.oapen.org _uhttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70998 _70 _zDOAB: description of the publication
999			_c35264 _d35264