000 02162naaaa2200265uu 4500
001 https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70862
041 0 _aEnglish
042 _adc
072 7 _aPSB
_2bicssc
100 1 _aPugh, Jonathan
_4auth
700 1 _aKahane, Guy
_4auth
245 1 0 _aChapter 12 Partiality for Humanity and Enhancement
260 _aOxford
_bOxford University Press
_c2016
300 _a1 electronic resource (11 p.)
506 0 _aOpen Access
_2star
_fUnrestricted online access
520 _aWe consider a strategy for justifying bio-conservative opposition to enhancement according to which we should resist radical departures from human nature, not because human nature possesses any intrinsic value, but because it is our nature. The idea is that we can be partial to humanity in the same way that common sense morality allows us to be partial to self, family, lovers, friends or our country. Whilst a similar idea was suggested by Bernard Williams and Jerry Cohen, it was not fully developed, and their arguments fail to mount a serious challenge to many forms of enhancement. We explore a better approach, drawing on recent literature about the nature and grounds of partiality, and attempt to elucidate what partiality for humanity might plausibly involve. We argue, however, that even if such partiality for humanity is defensible, it can at most only set limits on enhancement.
540 _aCreative Commons
_fhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
_2cc
_4https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
546 _aEnglish
650 7 _aBiochemistry
_2bicssc
653 _ahuman enhancement; bioconservatives
773 1 0 _0OAPEN Library ID: https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49607
_7nnaa
856 4 0 _awww.oapen.org
_uhttps://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/49607/1/Bookshelf_NBK401922.pdf
_70
_zDOAB: download the publication
856 4 0 _awww.oapen.org
_uhttps://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/49607/1/Bookshelf_NBK401922.pdf
_70
_zDOAB: download the publication
856 4 0 _awww.oapen.org
_uhttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70862
_70
_zDOAB: description of the publication
999 _c35394
_d35394