| 000 | 04516naaaa2200961uu 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/76736 | ||
| 005 | 20220220052705.0 | ||
| 020 | _abooks978-3-0365-1035-4 | ||
| 020 | _a9783036510347 | ||
| 020 | _a9783036510354 | ||
| 024 | 7 |
_a10.3390/books978-3-0365-1035-4 _cdoi |
|
| 041 | 0 | _aEnglish | |
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 072 | 7 |
_aGP _2bicssc |
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| 072 | 7 |
_aP _2bicssc |
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| 100 | 1 |
_aPetrosyan, Leon _4edt |
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| 700 | 1 |
_aPetrosyan, Leon _4oth |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | _aGame Theory |
| 260 |
_aBasel, Switzerland _bMDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute _c2021 |
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| 300 | _a1 electronic resource (248 p.) | ||
| 506 | 0 |
_aOpen Access _2star _fUnrestricted online access |
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| 520 | _aThe Special Issue “Game Theory” of the journal Mathematics provides a collection of papers that represent modern trends in mathematical game theory and its applications. The works address the problem of constructing and implementation of solution concepts based on classical optimality principles in different classes of games. In the case of non-cooperative behavior of players, the Nash equilibrium as a basic optimality principle is considered in both static and dynamic game settings. In the case of cooperative behavior of players, the situation is more complicated. As is seen from presented papers, the direct use of cooperative optimality principles in dynamic and differential games may bring time or subgame inconsistency of a solution which makes the cooperative schemes unsustainable. The notion of time or subgame consistency is crucial to the success of cooperation in a dynamic framework. In the works devoted to dynamic or differential games, this problem is analyzed and the special regularization procedures proposed to achieve time or subgame consistency of cooperative solutions. Among others, special attention in the presented book is paid to the construction of characteristic functions which determine the power of coalitions in games. The book contains many multi-disciplinary works applied to economic and environmental applications in a coherent manner. | ||
| 540 |
_aCreative Commons _fhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ _2cc _4https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
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| 546 | _aEnglish | ||
| 650 | 7 |
_aResearch & information: general _2bicssc |
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| 650 | 7 |
_aMathematics & science _2bicssc |
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| 653 | _apursuit | ||
| 653 | _acontrol functions | ||
| 653 | _aintegral constraints | ||
| 653 | _astrategies | ||
| 653 | _avalue of the game | ||
| 653 | _adecision-making | ||
| 653 | _agame theory | ||
| 653 | _aproject management | ||
| 653 | _adifferential games | ||
| 653 | _acooperative differential games | ||
| 653 | _aTime Consistency | ||
| 653 | _aIDP-core | ||
| 653 | _aIDP dominance | ||
| 653 | _atwo-sided platform market | ||
| 653 | _apricing | ||
| 653 | _aHotelling’s duopoly on the plane | ||
| 653 | _aNash equilibrium | ||
| 653 | _aoptimal location of platforms | ||
| 653 | _aprescribed duration | ||
| 653 | _acharacteristic function | ||
| 653 | _aenvironmental resource management | ||
| 653 | _apollution control | ||
| 653 | _adiscrete-time games | ||
| 653 | _acooperation | ||
| 653 | _athe core | ||
| 653 | _alinear transformation | ||
| 653 | _atime consistency | ||
| 653 | _amultistage game | ||
| 653 | _achance moves | ||
| 653 | _asubgame perfect equilibria | ||
| 653 | _acooperative trajectory | ||
| 653 | _aimputation distribution procedure | ||
| 653 | _arandom time horizon | ||
| 653 | _atime until failure | ||
| 653 | _adiscounted equilibrium | ||
| 653 | _aweibull distribution | ||
| 653 | _achen distribution | ||
| 653 | _aequivalence principle | ||
| 653 | _acooperative game | ||
| 653 | _asatisfaction criteria | ||
| 653 | _aproportional value | ||
| 653 | _aaxiomatization | ||
| 653 | _acooperative stochastic game | ||
| 653 | _astrong subgame consistency | ||
| 653 | _acore | ||
| 653 | _adynamic games | ||
| 653 | _amulticriteria games | ||
| 653 | _aNash bargaining solution | ||
| 653 | _adynamic stability | ||
| 653 | _arational behavior conditions | ||
| 653 | _aShapley-Solidarity value | ||
| 653 | _acoalition structure | ||
| 653 | _apotential | ||
| 653 | _abidding mechanism | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_awww.oapen.org _uhttps://mdpi.com/books/pdfview/book/4185 _70 _zDOAB: download the publication |
| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_awww.oapen.org _uhttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/76736 _70 _zDOAB: description of the publication |
| 999 |
_c67833 _d67833 |
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